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INTRODUCTION

"Fee shifting" refers to the rules for deciding which party to a lawsuit will pay
for the attorney fee costs of the suit.' The literature on fee shifting is extensive,
and virtually every page of it contains statements or predictions concerning the
effects of one fee system or another on the economic behavior of litigants or classes
of litigants. 2 Most of these statements are based on intuitive reasoning; with few
exceptions, 3 the literature does not contain logically rigorous models of the behavioral patterns that underlie the predictions. This is hardly surprising. It is extraordinarily difficult to model the behavior of litigants. Any attempt to do so quickly
makes apparent the large number of more or less arbitrary assumptions that must
underlie any firm statement about the effect of one method of fee payment versus
another.
This paper sets out to answer with rigor some questions about four distinct fee
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VAND. L. REV. 1216, 1218-21 (1967).
2. It is the thesis of this article that litigation decisions can be regarded and analyzed as "economic"
behavior. See generally R. POSNER, EcONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAvW (2d ed. 1977). For a discussion of the
general subject of two-person games, including equilibrium concepts, see R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMES
AND DECISIONS (1957).
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There have been two previous attempts to attack these questions with rigorous analysis. See R.

POSNER, supra note 2, at 434-40; Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial A Theoretical Analyss Under Alternative
Methodsfor the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982). Neither Posner's nor Shavell's model

treats the parties' expenditures on legal resources as endogenous continuous variables. The working paper
of Marilyn J. Simon, Incentives and the Allocation of Legal Costs: Products Liability (July 1982) (unpublished manuscript), examines some of the same issues as this article, using a model which determines legal
expenditures endogenously. The authors were unaware of Simon's work until after this article was drafted;
but where the analyses overlap, Simon reaches conclusions similar to the authors'.
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shifting systems: the "British" (loser pays all), the "American" (each party pays
own costs), one-way favoring plaintiffs (losing defendant pays all), and one-way
favoring defendants (losing plaintiff pays all). The reader will observe that these
4
characterizations of the four systems are already somewhat abstract and stylized.
There are two basic questions that motivate this effort. The first is analytical:
What is the effect of these systems on litigation behavior-such as the expenditure
on lawyers-of the two parties to a lawsuit? The second question is a derivative
policy issue: Which if any of these systems should be adopted as a matter of policy?
Answers to the first question are a necessary, but not a sufficient basis for
addressing the second. Policymaking requires in addition to analysis, the adoption
of an objective or policy goal. The number of possible policy goals here is very
large, and no particular alternative is actually adopted in this study; however, the
hypothesis that the American system tends to reduce the use of attorneys is
examined.
There is another type of question that can be addressed by analytical models
such as the one presented below. Why does the American legal system depart so
radically (in this respect) from the British? To be sure, British courts have long
awarded successful plaintiffs their costs, but by 1796 the American courts had
firmly rejected the idea of fee shifting. 5 Why? One possibility is the traditional
disrepute in which lawyers have been held in the United States. Lawrence
Friedman, in his influential history of the American bar, points out that lawyers in
colonial America were regarded with suspicion, as disreputable practitioners of an
unnecessary trade. 6 If so, and if early policymakers regarded the "American rule"
as likely to reduce overall expenditure on lawyers, then adoption of the rule can be
explained in terms of its anticipated economic effects. That is, the early American
attitude toward lawyers would logically have supported the adoption of the rule if
it were thought that the result would be a reduction on the overall social expenditure on lawyers. That there might be an economic basis for the adoption of a legal
rule may seem unlikely, but such an explanation is hardly less convincing than the
Supreme Court's effort to provide rationales for the rule:
In support of the American rule, it has been argued that since litigation is at best uncertain
one should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit, and that the
poor might be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the
penalty for losing included the fees of their opponents' counsel. . . . Also, the time,
expense, and difficulties of proof inherent in litigating the question of what constitutes rea7
sonable attorney's fees would pose substantial burdens for judicial administration.

Does the American rule, compared to the British, actually reduce the revenues
of lawyers? It is hoped that the analysis set forth below sheds some light on this
question.
4. For example, there are many exceptions in the United States to the "American" rule, and the
description of the "British" system ignores the distinction between "party and party" costs and "solicitor
and client" costs. See R. JACKSON, THE MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 518 (7th ed. 1977).
5. See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796). See also Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v.
Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
6. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 81-84 (1973).
7. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
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ANALYSIS

An economic model of certain aspects of the decision process of the parties to a
simple civil lawsuit is now presented to provide some answers to the questions set
out above. In order to give the reader some flavor of the sorts of assumptions that
must be made and the reasoning that must be used to arrive at rigorous answers, a
good deal of formal notation is included in the text. The primary results are stated
in the text using this notation, with the formal proofs appearing in the Appendix.
A.

The Parties

The facts of the case, the law, and the amount of damages claimed (and not in
dispute) are assumed to be known in advance. 8 Let the amount of the damages be
represented by W. It is assumed that the parties each have expectations as to the
outcome of a trial, expressed in terms of the probability that one side or the other
will prevail. It is traditional to assume that this probability depends only on the
facts and the law, but it is further assumed in this model that each party believes
the outcome depends also on the parties' expenditures on legal services. In particular, it is assumed that each party believes that its chances of prevailing will be
improved (at least somewhat) by an increase in its own expenditure on legal services, and diminished (at least somewhat) by an increase in its opponent's expenditure. This is noted formally by defining P to be the probability that the plaintiff
will prevail. Of course, 1-P is the probability that the defendant will prevail.
The function P encompasses the mechanics of the legal system itself, including due
process and the relationship between fact and law. The two parties are assumed to
have the same perceptions about the way that P depends on x,, x 2, and m:
P = P(x,,x-"m)
where
x1 = quantity (hours) of legal services purchased by plaintiff
x 2 = quantity (hours) of legal services purchased by defendant
m = the "merits" of the case.

An increase in x, or m will increase P; an increase in xi will decrease P.
Legal services are assumed to come in units of uniform quality at a price of Sf
per unit. Finally, it is assumed that each party is "risk neutral," seeking merely to
maximize the expected net dollar value of the outcome of the litigation. Thus, the
problem faced by each party is to choose the level of its own purchases of legal
services (r, or x 2 ). The model focuses on the effect on this decision of a change
from one to another of the fee shifting rules.
The assumptions made produce a somewhat stylized model of the litigation
process. Some, such as the assumptions of risk-neutrality, the absence of an
explicit model of settlement, the absence of a model of lawyer-client conflict of
interest, and neglect of the problem of party solvency, are undertaken without
apology in order to simplify the model and get to the point. Others seem more
8.

In other words, there is a dispute as to liability but no dispute as to the amount in question.
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serious. What justifies the notion that the outcome of a lawsuit should be modeled
as a stochastic process? It is, after all, the purpose of the legal system to reduce
uncertainty regarding the lawfulness of various acts. Lawyers, if not laymen, are
supposed to be able to predict with some precision what a court will do with a
given question because of the court's necessary reliance on precedent. But even in
such an ideal world, it must be conceded that there exist three sources of uncertainty as to the outcome of litigation. The first is the likelihood that in a changing
world facts arise which have no parallel in the decided cases, or at least no exact
parallel. Since judgment in such cases cannot be based precisely on precedent,
predictions as to the outcome necessarily rely on imperfect analogies, and such
predictions cannot be certain. Second, even leaving aside plain errors of fact, there
may in some cases be a degree of latitude allowed to the court which leaves the
judgment somewhat unpredictable. Finally, and most important for present purposes, the judicial process is by its nature dependent on the imperfect and incomplete information supplied by the parties. American courts are to a substantial
extent dependent on the evidence and the arguments presented by the plaintiff
and the defendant in each lawsuit. The quality and completeness of the evidence
and the argument (and the briefing on the law) will depend partly on what the
parties are willing to spend. Therefore, even if it were admitted that in some idealized judicial system a perfectly well-informed court would always reach the same
decision on the same facts, in the real world no court has such perfect information.
This justifies the assumption that the outcome of the litigation is stochastic and
also the assumption that the outcome depends to some extent on the expenditure
of the parties. It is this expenditure that informs the court.
At this stage of the analysis no restrictions are imposed on the shape of P.
Nevertheless, some possibilities suggest themselves. For example, it might be reasonable to suppose that increasing expenditure by a party has a diminishing marginal effect on p.9
B.

The Legal Systems

The next task is to characterize formally the four legal systems; the British, the
American, and the one-way systems favoring the plaintiff or the defendant. While
the primary motive is to compare the pure British and American systems, it is also
useful to test whether a one-way system does what it is supposed to do (such as
discourage "frivolous" or "nuisance" suits).
Let V' and r1 be the expected values of the dollar outcome of the litigation for
plaintiff and defendant respectively. Then
(1)
V = WP -Jf, (I-bP) - f- 2(k+b) (I -P)
(2)

V 2 = -WP-fxI (bP) - fx 2 1-1 - (k+b) (I-P)J

In words, equation (1) says that the expected value of the lawsuit to the plain9. The parties here agree on what P is, given the equilibrium values of x 1 , and x 2 . If they also agree
on the merits, then there will generally be an incentive to settle. We do not model settlement here. The
present results apply, therefore, to fully litigated cases. In a more general model, parties might disagree on
the merits and therefore on the value of P, and there would not necessarily exist a range of mutually
profitable settlement opportunities.
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tiff is equal to the amount of the damages (h) times the probability (P) of collecting them, less the expenses of litigation. The expenses of litigation depend on
the plaintiff's own consumption of legal services (x,), the fee per unit of lawyers'
services (/), the probability of winning (P), and the legal rules regarding which
party pays (represented by k and b). A similar interpretation applies to the
defendant's equation (2).
The general system defined by equations (1) and (2) is "general" because certain values for k and b correspond to the four fee shifting systems that are to be
investigated. Other values of k and b correspond to various partial or multiple fee
shifting systems that are not investigated here. An intuitive interpretation of the
variables k and b is as follows: When k = 0, b is the proportion of the winner's
legal fees that is shifted to the loser. When b = 0, k is the proportion of a winning
defendant's legal fees paid by the plaintiff.
Consider, for example, the American system. If k = b = 0, then the equations
(1) and (2) can be rewritten simply as
V = WP -fx
(3)
V2 = -WP-fX 2.
(4)
Thus, each side always pays (only) its own legal fees. The plaintiff in equation
(3) values the lawsuit at its expected outcome (WIP) less its certain attorney's
bill(fx,).
In contrast, to model the British system, let k = 0 and b = 1. Equations (1) and
(2) can then be rewritten as
(5)
(6)

V' = WP -fx,(I-P)
U2 = - WP - fxP

-fX 2 (1-P)
- fx 2 p.

In other words, for the plaintiff the expected value of the lawsuit is equal to the
expected value of the damages (WP), less the expected value of having to pay his
own (if he loses) and his opponent's legal costs. The probability of losing is of
course (1-P). A similar analysis applies to the defendant. A successful plaintiff
wins W and pays no legal fees, while a successful defendant pays nothing at all.
To model one-way fee shifting favoring defendants, let k = 1 and b = 0. Equations (1) and (2) can then be rewritten as
-fX2 (I-P)
V" = WP-f
V2 = -WP -fxP.

In words again, the plaintiff's expected value is equal to the expected value of
the damages (WP), less its own certain legal costs (lx,), less the expected value of
its opponent's legal costs (fx2 ), which the plaintiff will have to pay if it fails, which
it will with probability (1-P). In this case, the defendant's situation is not symmetrical. The defendant values the lawsuit at its expected payout (- WP), less its
expected legal costs, which it pays only if the plaintiff prevails. In order to model
one-way fee shifting favoring plaintiffs, let k - -1 and b = 1 so that for the plaintiff and defendant, respectively
v = WP -f_ (I-P)
V2 = -WP - fxIP - fx.
This completes the formal description of the four legal systems. Before an anal-
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ysis of the model is performed, it should be noted that under all of the fee shifting
schemes considered, payments for legal services are not made on a contingency fee
basis. More specifically, payments for legal services are based directly on the
amount of legal services used, rather than on some percentage of damages
awarded. The issue of contingent fees, while interesting, is beyond the scope of the
present investigation. It should also be observed that when the parties both agree
on the merit of the case, m, then under all four systems the sum of the expected
values to the parties is negative and precisely equal to the sum of the legal expenditures. Therefore, the parties would settle if they could. In this analysis, however, it
is assumed that for some reason they cannot agree on a settlement.
C.

Analyzing the Model

It is assumed that each party seeks to maximize its own expected value (V or
V2) by manipulating its own consumption of legal services (x, orx 2 ) in light of the
facts, the law, the rules regarding fee shifting, and the other party's decision about
legal services. Therefore, this analysis employs the standard (Nash) equilibrium
concept, which has the property that each of the two parties, knowing what the
other has chosen to spend, nevertheless is disinclined to alter its own behavior.
An equilibrium thus consists of choices of x, and x 2 such that each party simultaneously optimizes the value of the lawsuit to itself. Formally, this requires that
(7)

V.(x,x?, W,k,bf,m) = 0

i=

1,2

where subscripts indicate partial differentiation. This is nothing more than the
requirement that each party has optimized its position in the litigation.
Three basic questions could be asked of the model at this point: What is the
effect on each party's consumption of legal services of an increase in the "stakes"
(4)? Similarly, what would be the effect on litigation expenditure of a change in
the hourly rate (/) of lawyers? Finally, what influence is there on the litigation
decision from the variable m, representing the "merits" of the plaintiff's case?
These questions are ones about which it is possible to have quite strong intuitive
opinions, which can be used to test the plausibility of the model. It would be
surprising, for example, if the model predicted that a party would spend more to
litigate a smaller claim (other things being equal), or that a party would buy more
legal services if its lawyer's hourly rate went up. The article will return to these
questions below.
There is a second and more interesting set of questions that can be asked of the
model at this point: What happens if the rules regarding who pays the lawyers are
changed? That is, for given values of W,f, and m, what changes in overall expenditure would result from a switch from the American to the British system?
The way to examine, for example, the effect of moving from the American
system to a one-way system favoring defendants is to ask what sign dx,/dk (for i = I
or 2) or d(x,+ x2)/dk takes on when b = 0 and 0 < k < 1. These derivatives
correspond to the slopes of the curves that relate the legal system parameter (k) to
the expenditures of the parties (x,) and their aggregate (x,+ x 2 ). If this slope is
negative, then a change from the American to the one-way system will tend to
reduce spending on lawyers; if it is positive, the change increases spending. Simi-
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larly, the American and British systems can be compared by examining the sign of
dx,/db and d(x,+ x,9/db when k = 0 and 0 < b < 1. In each case, of course, the
model keeps x, and x 2 at their equilibrium values, given the relevant changes in
the rules (i.e., changes in k and b).
To examine the litigation decision itself, imagine that (7) is satisfied and that m
(the merits) is varied while the other parameters are held constant. There will be
some value of m-call it m *-such that the expected value to the plaintiff of
bringing the lawsuit is just equal to zero. Clearly, if the merits were any less
favorable to the plaintiff the case would not be brought. It is now possible to ask
what the effect is on m * of alternative legal systems. For example, would a change
from the American to the British system raise or lower the minimum merit that a
case must have before a plaintiff will go to court?
No matter what policy objective one might wish to pursue, it is useful to know
about the parties' level of expenditure and the minimum merit of their cases. But
the analysis can also be used to address economic welfare questions. Which system
should be adopted in order to achieve a given policy objective? Obviously there
are many possible policies that one might wish to pursue.
D.

Some More Assumptions

The assumptions made so far have insulated the model from the complications
of reality. These assumptions, especially the absence of any restrictions on the
form of P, have made the model quite general. Unfortunately, general models are
notoriously difficult ones from which to wring specific results. The object here is to
employ the modeler's art to find that minimum of additional special assumptions
or restrictions necessary to get the model to say something usefully specific. To
that end, attention will be restricted to equilibrium values10 of x, and x 2 , and
stable equilibria at that.1" Furthermore, rather than examining the conditions
under which an increase in the price of lawyers (/) will lead to a decline in demand
for their services, this model will simply assume a downward-sloping demand
curve, that is, a reduction in quantity of hours demanded as hourly rates increase.
As demonstrated in the Appendix, the assumptions which result in such a demand
curve imply upper and lower bounds for V, 2 . The sign of V,'2 is of very little
intrinsic interest. In short, it is the marginal effect of an increase in the defendant's
use of lawyers on the marginal value to the plaintiff of an increase in the plaintiff's
use of lawyers. This is not easy to think about. But the sign of VJ2 turns out to be
of central importance in deciding, for example, whether a change from the British
to the American system will increase or decrease the propensity to bring meritorious small claims, a point on which many commentators have strong intuitive
views. If these views can be shown to depend on rather special behavioral assumptions, it will be easier to give them proper weight.
10. The assumption that the parties are in equilibrium may seem somewhat curious, since they may
"play the game" only once, and thus have little opportunity to find an equilibrium.
11. Stability means that if the parties are at an equilibrium, a small perturbation will not result in a
further movement away from the equilibrium. The meaning and realism of this assumption in the present
context are of course debatable.
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Restrictions placed on the signs and values of partial and cross-partial derivatives of V' (for i = 1 or 2) correspond to the shape of P, the function that relates
legal resource inputs by both parties (and the merits) to judicial output. Students
and practitioners are likely to have views based on experience and insight that will
provide concrete reasons to restrict the generality of V'. These restrictions will
usually produce more determinate results than the ones derived here on the basis
of such abstract restrictions as equilibrium and stability.
E.

Some Results

One of the first questions asked above, partly as a check on the plausibility of
the model itself, is what effect an increase in the stakes (4) will have on the
behavior of the parties. The model provides a sensible answer to this question:
Proposition /.-Increasing the Stakes. Under the assumptions stated in Section D, any increase
in W, the amount in dispute, will increase the expenditures by both parties to the lawsuit,
and it will do so regardless of what rules apply to fee shifting. 12

There is, however, a much more interesting result. Recall that the American
system is characterized by setting k = b = 0, while a system with one-way fee
shifting favoring defendants is characterized by k = 1 and b = 0. Knowing what
happens to x, x 2 and their sum as k moves from 0 to 1 will indicate what a move
from the American system to such a one-way system will do to expenditures on
lawyers in a given lawsuit. The a priori view is that a system designed to discourage nuisance suits should reduce such expenditures.
Proposthon 2: American to One- Way Defendant. Under the assumptions made above, a movement from the American system to one favoring successful defendants will indeed
encourage defendants to spend more in their own defense, but it cannot generally be said
what the effect will be on plaintiffs. Nevertheless, the total expenditures by the two parties
combined will increase. 13

This is a surprising result. It runs counter to intuition. Why should overall
expenditure on lawyers increase as a result of a policy designed to discourage nuisance suits? The answer, apparently, is that the reduction in the budget inhibitions of defendants more than overcomes the increased caution which may be
exhibited by the plaintiffs.
The analogous result for a given lawsuit in a system that favors successful
plaintiffs (private antitrust or employment discrimination plaintiffs, for example)
is:
Propositon 3: American to One- Way Plaintiff Under the assumptions made above, a movement from the American system to one favoring successful plaintiffs will encourage plaintiffs to spend more on their cases. The effect on defendants is not predictable. Nevertheless,
the total expenditures by the two parties combined will increase. 14

This result seems consistent with a priori expectations.
Now let us compare the "pure" alternatives: In the American system everyone
pays his own lawyer-win, lose, or draw: k = b = 0. The British have full two-way
fee shifting: k = 0, b = 1. What happens when b goes from zero to one?
12.

See Appendix foel proof.

13.
14.

See Appendix for proof.
See Appendix for proof.

Page 173: Winter 1984]

EcONOMIC ANALYSIS

Arposition 4 American to British. Having made the assumptions already noted, it is not possible to say in general whether either party individually will spend more or less as a result of
adopting the British system. However, expenditures 15by the two parties combined will be
higher under the British than the American system.

It seems that the early American legislators and judges knew what they were
doing. The adoption of the American system has the unambiguous effect of
reducing the revenues derived by the legal profession from a case. Put another
way, from the point of view of economic welfare, the American system of prohibiting fee shifting provides justice more efficiently than the British, by reaching
judicial decisions at lower overall social cost.
Finally, consider the effects of the different legal systems on the minimum level
of merit of cases that plaintiffs will be induced to bring. Recall that m * 'is defined
as the minimum level of merit that a case must have to be brought at all, given
equilibrium levels of the variables x; and x<. That is,
(8)
V '(x;, x,
,.k, bf,m *) = 0.
How does m * vary as the method of paying lawyers moves from the American to
other systems? To see the results, for example, of a shift to a one-way system
favoring defendants, set b = 0, hold W andf constant, and totally differentiate (8)
while noting that V = 0. The result is
V2 dr9 /dk + V
(9)

dm */dk

= -

It is known from Proposition 2 that dx 2/dk > 0; the Appendix shows that V < 0,
that Vk = -fX 2 (1-P) < 0, and that V > 0, all at equilibrium. Thus, dm */dk > 0.
It follows that any case that would be brought under a one-way system favoring
defendants would also be brought under the American system. But the converse is
not true. Thus, the effect of adopting a system designed to favor successful defendants is indeed to raise the minimum level of merit of cases and hence to reduce the
number of cases brought.
It turns out that the effect on m * of a change from the American to the British
system or even to the one-way system favoring plaintiffs is ambiguous. That is,
statements about the relative minimum level of merit of cases brought under the
systems are either without foundation or are based on even stronger assumptions
than those made in this article.
III
AN ASSESSMENT

It only takes a few months of struggling with an intractable mathematical formulation to engender appreciation for the careful analyst's concern about conclusions based solely on intuition. It has been a major aim of this article to illustrate
the sorts of assumptions that necessarily lie behind predictions such as the British
15.

See Appendix for proof.
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system will discourage meritless litigation. Indeed, given the assumptions made
here (which were not totally unrestrictive) one cannot say whether it does or not.
In a substantive sense, this article provides one of the first rigorous models of
the effects of fee shifting in which expenditure on legal resources is determined
within the model, and thus provides a real opportunity to test at the conceptual
level the link between the historical prejudice against lawyers and the rule against
fee shifting. The two are consistent insofar as for any given case brought to trial
the American system results in lower legal expenditures.
IV
FURTHER RESEARCH
Aside from filling out the table, so to speak, by carrying out all the comparisons
that are possible, there is a good deal of modeling work that remains to be done. It
is fascinating, for example, to consider that values for k and b other than those
explored here would lower parties' expenditures even below the levels that would
obtain under the American system. More precisely, it is possible that some system
ofpartzal fee shifting could reduce the overall societal expenditure for resolution of
a given dispute even further than under the American system. Indeed, it might
even be possible to solve for the fee shifting system that optimizes some less simpleminded concept of social welfare.
There are other directions for potential research, identified in a number of
places in the text itself. The model could be extended to include risk-averse or
risk-loving behavior on the part of the participants. It would also be interesting to
generalize the analysis to instances in which the parties disagree on the size of the
stakes or the form of the function indicating the probability that the plaintiff will
prevail. These extensions will introduce more generality and hence quite possibly
more indeterminacy in the analytic results. It may, therefore, be worthwhile to
examine the possibility and plausibility of further restrictions on the functional
forms in the structure of the analysis.
TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Changing from:
Item
Plaintiffs' Expenditures
Defendants' Expenditures
Combined Expenditures
Minimum Merit of Cases

American to
British

American to
one-way (def.)

American to
one-way (pl.)

ambiguous
ambiguous
increase
ambiguous

ambiguous
increase
increase
increase

increase
ambiguous
increase
ambiguous
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APPENDIX

To aid in the development of the general model, (1) and (2) are rewritten as:
VI

V

2 (k+b)

where A = W +fxb +fx
must be the case that

AP - f/ - f

=

2

=

-AP -fx

2 (k+b)

(I-k-b)

2

> 0. At a regular interior Nash equilibrium, it

V/ = AP, -f(I-bP) = 0

(A 1)

V,11 = AP,/ + 2/bP, < 0
(A2)

V2 = -AP

2

-f(k+b)P -f/I - (k+b)% = 0

V 2 2 = -A, 22 - 2fP2 (k+b) < 0

where subscripts indicate partial differentiation.
Key to the results which follow are various second order cross-partial derivatives, especially
AP 2 + JbP2 + f(k+b)P I
-AP 2 , - fP 2 - f(k+b)P, = -V

V12
V2

=

=

2.

The following also are used:
V1k = PRfx 2 > 0
V2 = -P2fX2 +f(I-P) > 0
fP +fP,(x, + X2) > 0

V/b

V 2b =f(-P) -fP 2 (x, + X2) > 0
V/1 = P/ > 0
= -P2 > 0

2

V I = P,[/xb + X2 (k+b)J - I + bP
+ x 2 (k+b)/ - I + (k+b)(I-P).

V2= -P2/xlb

While Vf and V2 cannot be signed globally, at equilibrium, (Al) and (A2)
must hold so that
V,>t= -WPl/f < 0
V 2 = Wp2 /f < 0

(A3)
(A4)

Proposthion I. dx,/df < 0 iffdx,/dW > 0, i = 1,2
Proof. Totally differentiating (Al) and (A2) with respect to f
Cramer's Rule yields
dx,/df= (V 2
- (V/V
dx2 /df

where r = V, VJ2 -

V,/

V2/
- V V)/
V /
+2

V2 + (V,2)2 > 0. In view of (A3) and (A4)

V2 = V

these become
dx/df = W(R, V -? + P2
dx2 idf= -W(P

2

VI, -

v/ 2)

/ri

=

WT,/

, V12) Irf- WT 2 1f

Therefore dx,/df < 0 ifj7ff < 0. Similarly,
d,/dW
d(I
x2 1dW

Substituting for V11 and V,

and solving via

(VJ(V

yields

V '2

VA V$2
2

/

/
+ V2, V11) Ir.
V 12-
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dX,dW=
d

2 1dw

(p, V2 + P2 V//r

-

= (P

P

V/I/ -

2

=-

V/2)1 = -T

2.

Clearly dx,/df and dx,/dW are of opposite signs.
Stabi'ty. The first order condition V' = 0 defines a reactionfunction for the plaintif
x. *(x2,). The inverse of its slope at any point is given by R,
V/,/ V/ 2 . Similarly, the first order condition V2 = 0 defines the defendant's reactionfunction xf*(,
whose slope at any point is given by R 2 = V/ 2 / V.
Stability of equilibrium
this with the
Combining
0.
2>
(V/)
V2
V/,
I or
requires that I R, I > I
assumptions that dx,/df > 0 and T < 0 produces the key expressions

f2 V-->V

(A5)
(A6)

>_2 V

V
T-

22

-/P 2
I

12

/

22

Proposition 2." Given stability and dx,/df < 0, (T, < 0), z = 1,2, then dx/dk > 0 and
d(x,+x 2) /dk > 0.
Proof- By a now-familiar process,
dx,/dk =

(v/

V VA)/r.

2V-

Upon substitution, this becomes
(A7)

dx,/dk =f/(-P)

V/

x2 (P 2 V/ 2 +P, V 2 2j /r.

2 -

While dx/dk > 0 if V/ 2 >=0, in general its sign is indeterminate; however, the
defendant's case proves more tractable:
(A8)

dx2/dk

dx21dk

= -f/V/,

= -

(V/k

V/

+ V2 V/ 1 ) /r

(I-P) - x 2 (V/, P 2 -

dX2 /dk = -f V/

> 0

V/2 P,)l/r

(I-P)/r - x2f r

> 0

Adding (A7) and (A8) and rearranging yields the following:
(A9)

d(x,+ x 2)ldk

fi/(I-P) (V/

2 -

V/)/r-fx

2 (T 1

+

1').

The last term of (A9) is positive by hypothesis. The first term has the same sign as
2V/. Using (A5),
VII - vl
> - vl/((P2 /P,) + /) = -v/,(P, + P2,)/ P,
Now rearrangement of the first order conditions (Al) and (A2) yields, at equilibrium, the general condition
(A10)

P + P2 =f/(k+b)(1-P) - bP//A.

When, as in the present case, b = 0, P + P2 = jk(I-P)/A > 0.
Therefore V/ 2 - V/, > 0 and d(x, + x 2)/dk > 0.
American to One- Way Plazhtif This comparison can be made by setting k = -g and
b =g so that (1) and (2) become
V= WP -fx /(-gP)
V' = -WP - fxgP - fx 2

Then g = 0 represents the American system and g = 1 that favoring plaintiffs.
The first order equilibrium conditions are then
VI = WP/ -f(/-gP) +fxIgP1 = 0
V2 2 = -WP

2

-fxIgP

2

-f

0
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Proposition 3 Given stability and dx,/df < 0, (T < 0), i = 1,2, dx,/dg > 0, and
d(x,+x2) /dg > 0.
Proof: Using the same techniques as before yields
(All)

dx,/dg = -f ((P + xP) Vf2 + xP 2 VI 2 ) /r
dx,/dg = -f/p V 2 + x,(P, V 2 + P2 Vj,)/ /r
2
dx,/dg = -fp V 22
1r - xITf > 0.

However,
(A12)

dx2 /dg = -f (Vj

V1/
2 (P + xP)) /r

x1P2 -

ispositive if V, 2 > 0 but is indeterminate in general. Nevertheless, adding (A 1l)
and (A12) and rearranging yields
(A13)

d(x,+ x 2 )/dg = -f

((P+xlP) (Vi, + V

2

)

-

x2P 2 (V

£

-

V/ 2 )) /r

Now the last term in (A13),fx1P 2 (V'i/ - V12) /, is positive by the argument used
to prove Proposition 2. Using (A6), V2 + V' < V22 (P, + P2)/ P2. From (A 10),
it can be seen thatP, + P2 = -gfP/A = 0 whenk = -g andb =g. Thus, V;'2+
V12 <0 and d(x, + x 2)/dg > 0.
Proposition I.-Given stability, k = 0, and dx,/df < 0, i = 1,2, then d(x,+x 2) /db > 0.
Proof- By the usual process, it is determined that
dxld ==(V2
-,/2b

which is positive if V

2

V
V11

I V2 )lr
V/blVb
2

-

> 0, but ambiguous in general. Also,
dxldb

=

-(V2

v

+ V

2

Vk) /r

is ambiguous; however, adding these together gives
2(
d(-,,+x 2 ) /db = -IVh(V,

-

V1 I2) + VlV

2 + Vl2Jl,
I2
2,

Since V b and V2 are both positive, the arguments in the proofs of Propositions 2
and 3, respectively, demonstrating that the terms in parentheses are negative, suffice for d(x, + x2)/db > 0.
Changes in "men'" To examine how changes in merit affect the expected payoff to
the plaintiff, it should be noted that
V

2

= AP2- f(k+b) (-P)

= -f - v2

which is negative at equilibrium. Also, V,' = AP,, > 0.

